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Abstract: 
After the German reunification, interregional subsidies accounted for approximately 
four percent of gross fixed capital investment in the new federal states. We show that 
between 1992 and 2005 infrastructure and (small) business aid had a negative net 
impact on regional economic growth. This suggests that regional redistribution was 
ineffective, potentially due to a lack of spatial concentration to create growth poles. 
Keywords:  Regional growth, redistribution, infrastructure, investment 
subsidies 
JEL-Classification:  R11, R42, R58.  
Non technical summary 
The regional redistribution of capital after the German reunification has been sizeable. 
From 1991 to 2007 investment projects totalling €237 billion have been supported with 
subsidies of €58.7 billion under the Joint Agreement for the Improvement of Regional 
Economic Structures.  
The growth effect of capital subsidies continues to be a matter of debate in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Capital subsidies have the potential to further the 
agglomeration of firms and thereby to provide a stimulus to employment and economic 
growth. However, it has been frequently argued that a broad support of too many 
regions can lead to a mis-allocation of productive resources and consequently to 
negative growth effects. So far the majority of empirical growth studies on regions have 
neglected capital subsidies due to the lack of data. 
We use a data set of capital subsidies to economically and structurally weak German 
regions. The data consists of investment subsidies granted for business and 
infrastructure investments in East and West German districts for the period 1992 und 
2005. Our results provide evidence for a lack of convergence between German districts 
and negative net effect of the capital subsidies. In our view, the results do not 
necessarily imply that capital subsidies are overall ineffective to stimulate growth. 
Rather, it may signal the lack of concentrating capital subsidies on regional growth 
poles i.e. regions where capital subsidies have the potential to lead to sustained growth. 
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Die regionale Umverteilung von finanziellen Mitteln nach der deutschen 
Wiedervereinigung ist ökonomisch signifikant. Zwischen 1991 und 2007 wurden 
Investitionen im Umfang von €237 Milliarden mit regionalen Subventionen von €58,7 
Milliarden im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur“ gefördert.  
Der Wachstumseffekt solcher Subventionen ist sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch 
unklar. Einerseits können Förderungsmassnahmen die Ansiedlungen von Unternehmen 
und somit Beschäftigung und Wachstum fördern. Andererseits kann eine zu breite 
Förderung zu vieler Regionen auch zu Fehlallokation von Produktionsfaktoren und 
somit negativen Wachstumseffekten führen. Die meisten empirischen regionalen 
Wachstumsstudien vernachlässigen diese Subventionen auf Grund der schwierigen 
Datenlage, so dass diese Frage unbeantwortet bleibt. 
Wir nutzen detaillierte Daten regionaler Förderungsmaßnahmen hinsichtlich 
Infrastruktur und Gewerbe in ost- und westdeutschen Kreisen zwischen 1992 und 2005, 
um deren Wachstumseffekt empirisch zu bestimmen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen 
lediglich schwache Konvergenz der Kreise innerhalb der gesamten Bundesrepublik und 
einen negativen Nettoeffekt der beiden untersuchten Förderungsmassnahmen. Dies 
bedeutet nicht zwangsweise, dass regionale Subventionen keinen Wachstumseffekt 
haben. Vielmehr ist es ein mögliches Anzeichen dafür, dass Förderungsmassnahmen 
nicht ausreichend konzentriert sind, um Wachstumspole zu schaffen und nachhaltig zu 
unterstützen.  
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Does regional redistribution spur growth?
*) 
1 Introduction 
The German reunification in 1989 represented the fastest and most radical 
transformation of two juxtaposing economic systems in recent history with uncertain 
outcomes. Potential gains from a comprehensive and quick unification were expected to 
follow especially from large scale federal investment schemes to develop economically 
ailing regions, primarily in or close to the former German Democratic Republic (Jones 
and Wild, 1994). In fact, between 1992 and 1998, Burda and Hunt (2001) document 
infrastructure investment on the order of DM 140 billions in formerly eastern regions, 
which was around a third of the entire infrastructure investment volume.
1 Most of these 
funds are transfer payments from more prosperous regions to less developed, mostly 
eastern, as to facilitate economic growth and development. 
These subsidies amount effectively to economic aid, which primarily takes two 
forms: infrastructure investment and corporate investment subsidies (CIS), especially to 
small and medium enterprises. The effectiveness of either form of economic aid 
continues to be subject to debate on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Aschauer, 
1989; Easterly, 2003; Rajan and Subramaniam, 2005). Most of this debate concerns 
national economies. In this paper, we conjecture that the discussion on the effectiveness 
of redistribution payments also transcends to regional economic interactions. We 
investigate if the persistent and economically significant subsidies to districts primarily 
located in the new federal states facilitated regional growth.  
A priori, this is unclear. For example, Démurger (2001) reports for 24 regions in 
China that especially transportation infrastructure helps to close regional income gaps. 
She finds that infrastructure investments spur growth directly through reducing 
transportation costs and indirectly by generating positive spatial spill-over effects across 
                                                 
*)  Koetter: M.Koetter@rug.nl.Wedow: michael.wedow@bundesbank.de; Koetter acknowledges financial 
support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO. We would like to thank 
Heinz Herrmann and Dan Stegarescu for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also indebted to 
the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning for support and feedback on the data. Any 
remaining errors are, of course, our own. 
1   Burda and Hunt (2001) note that transfer payments are persistent and accounted for approximately 5 
percent of German GDP, or 75 billion Euro p.a., in the period between 1990 and 2000.   2 
regions. Cain (1997) draws similar conclusions for the regions in the US. However, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) report that the European Structural Fund support for 
objective 1 regions did not contribute to regional income convergence.
2 Their findings 
suggest that infrastructure subsidies and, to a lesser extent, business subsidies yield 
negative returns between 1989 and 1999. The absence of positive effects relates to 
theoretical explanations in Brakman et al. (2002). They extend the tax-competition 
model of Baldwin and Krugman (2000). Many studies conjecture that relatively high 
regional taxes can have ‘spreading forces’ since they induce entrepreneurs to re-locate. 
Brakman et al. (2002) argue that these centrifugal forces of economic activity have to be 
balanced with pecuniary benefits of effective (local) government spending. Put 
differently, spatial differences in the effective and efficient provision of public goods 
endogenously determine clusters of economic activity. The redistribution of tax-payers 
funds in the form of infrastructure projects, and direct investment support for business, 
can therefore influence regional economic output asymmetrically across districts. 
Specifically, agglomeration effects can be negative if “the (in)efficiency of the 
government sector might frustrate the effectiveness of extra spending” (Brakman et al. 
2002). Put differently, if (local) governments are less efficient in the provision of public 
goods, such as infrastructure, this might induce firms to wander off where the trade-off 
between paying taxes and obtaining public services in return is more favorable for them. 
Previous studies on regional growth in Germany neglect these substantial 
subsidies. To the best of our knowledge, the growth effects of interregional subsidies 
are therefore unknown.
3 We use unique data on interregional subsidies in a neo-classical 
growth model to assess the effect on growth in German districts between 1992 and 
2005.  
                                                 
2   Objective 1 regions are those below the 75% threshold EU average. 
3   Important studies of German regional growth focus on, for example, regional labor markets (Funke and 
Strulik, 1999), the formation of human capital (Funke and Niebuhr, 2005), or innovate on how to 
account for spatial autocorrelation (Kosfeld et al. 2006).   3
2  Methodology and data 
We estimate a neoclassical growth model as in Kosfeld et al. (2006) covering 419 
German districts (‘Kreise’) located in both eastern and western states between 1992 and 
2005.
4 Our main interest is if infrastructure subsidies and/or CIS yield a positive growth 
effect. We estimate the following model: 
(1)  ,2005 1 ,1992 2 3 4 (ln ) ln ln ln ln rrr r r r Y Y INFRA CIS X 0 =α +β +β +β +β +ε  
Regional GDP per capita Yr is regressed on the two types of subsidies and a vector 
of conventional controls in the neoclassical growth model Xr. The latter includes mean 
population growth per region and the investment ratio for the respective federal state of 
region r.
5 We also control for human capital to determine regional growth by specifying 
the average share of university educated citizens among persons enrolled in the regional 
social security system.  
The key variables of interest are infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies 
INFRA and CIS per capita routed to region r. Both variables are averaged over the 
sample period. We obtain this data from the Federal Office for Building and Regional 
Planning and describe it in Table 1. 
Table 1: Growth summary statistics German municipalities 1992 – 2005 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per Capita 5,867 22,386 9,284 6,382 83,463
Population growth 5,221 0.001 0.010 -0.083 0.062
Investment ratio 6,146 0.236 0.095 0.119 0.599
Human capital 5,707 0.040 0.025 0.000 0.189
CIS 6,585 39.36 106.75 0.000 2,830
INFRA 6,585 19.22 67.19 0.000 1,380
Notes:  GDP, CIS and INFRA per capita in Euros. All remaining variables in percent.  
 
 
                                                 
4   We lack population data for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and the districts Eisenach and Wetteraukreis 
before 1994. 
5   We assume that technical change g and depreciation rates δ jointly are 9 percent. Investment ratios at 
district level are not available.   4 
3 Subsidies  considered 
The regional subsidies considered in this paper comprise investment support 
under the Joint Agreement for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures.
6 It is 
the explicit objective of the Agreement to support economically and structurally weak 
regions and to enable these regions to participate in the general economic development. 
The funds under the agreement subsidize investment projects of primarily small and 
medium sized enterprises in the manufacturing industry and business relevant 
infrastructure. The Federal government and the federal states are jointly sharing the 
costs while the federal states are responsible for the management. Given that only 
structurally weak regions are supported under the agreement not all districts have access 
to subsidies under the agreement. German districts are differentiated in six different 
groups according to their structural problems, of which five groups are eligible for 
subsidies. With respect to subsidies to the manufacturing industry, the subsidy rates 
vary across the five groups and the type of firm that is supported. Firms in regions with 
more significant structural problems obtain larger subsidy rates. In addition, the subsidy 
component is also larger for small and medium enterprises (CIS). Figure 1 in the 
appendix provides an overview on the assisted regions and subsidy rates for the 
manufacturing industry. The majority of eligible regions is located near or in the new 
Federal States and Berlin. Investments in business relevant infrastructure can be 
subsidized at the discretion of the federal state with up to 90 percent. Table 2 contains 
the volume of subsidies separated by type of investment addressed and region. Table 5 
in the appendix shows that the new federal states in the East benefited the most from the 
capital subsidies. They account for about 90 percent of all subsidies to manufacturing 
and infrastructure investments. Subsidies are primarily directed towards business 
investments which accounted for 66 percent of all subsidies. 
                                                 
6 Gemeinschaftsaufgabe “Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“.   5
Table 2: Subsidy Volume by Type and Region in € million, 1991-2007 
Year CIS Infrastructure CIS Infrastructure CIS Infrastructure
1991 4,093 1,789 375 307 3,718 1,483
1992 2,884 1,555 329 215 2,555 1,340
1993 2,791 2,751 219 229 2,572 2,522
1994 2,959 2,811 229 137 2,730 2,674
1995 2,179 2,175 194 133 1,985 2,041
1996 3,131 1,047 213 109 2,918 938
1997 2,430 1,189 272 77 2,158 1,111
1998 3,019 822 264 58 2,756 764
1999 2,433 918 360 65 2,073 853
2000 1,601 762 185 67 1,415 695
2001 1,892 596 213 82 1,679 514
2002 1,715 874 184 170 1,531 703
2003 1,658 841 250 179 1,408 662
2004 1,474 516 153 100 1,322 416
2005 1,231 694 163 116 1,068 578
2006 1,854 384 217 64 1,637 320
2007 1,426 353 202 10 1,235 343
Sum 38,770 20,077 4,022 2,118 34,760 17,957
Source: Federal Office of Economics and Export Control
Note: Includes GA and EFRE.
All Federal States Old Federal States New Federal States
 
4 Results 
Baseline results in the first column of Table 3 show that the initial income 
coefficient provides evidence of existing, yet very slow convergence (0.9%). We then 
augment the model with both subsidy controls.   6 
Table 3: District growth regression with subsidies 1992 - 2005 
Baseline CIS INFRA BOTH INTER
GDP1992 0.890*** 0.889*** 0.883*** 0.889*** 0.891***
[29.39] [28.60] [28.81] [28.47] [31.22]
CIS -0.001 0.014* -0.001
[0.17] [1.78] [0.14]
INFRA -0.016** -0.028*** -0.079***
[2.21] [3.28] [6.13]
CIS x INFRA 0.024***
[5.09]
EAST dummy 0.199** 0.201** 0.248*** 0.256*** 0.054
[2.18] [2.21] [2.69] [2.74] [0.59]
Investment ratio 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.301*** 0.285*** 0.263***
[3.13] [3.14] [3.03] [2.85] [3.43]
Human Capital 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.053***
[2.94] [2.88] [2.83] [2.90] [2.80]
Population growth 0.145 0.138 0.105 0.154 0.136
[0.99] [0.84] [0.68] [0.94] [0.99]
Constant 2.380*** 2.376*** 2.345*** 2.378*** 2.266***
[4.89] [4.79] [4.74] [4.79] [5.29]
Implied λ 0.0090 0.0091 0.0096 0.0091 0.0089
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90
Notes: 419 observations. Robust t-statistics in brackets. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1 percent. CIS denotes 
corporate investement subsidies to districts and INFRA measure regional infrastructure investment subsidies. 
All variables measures as logged mean values per district between 1992 and 2005. Implied λ denotes the 
speed of convergence.  
The individual effect of policies to support individual firms to conduct 
investments did not enhance output growth at the district level. This could either 
indicate that subsidized firms are just not able to convert exogenous reductions of their 
cost of capital into profitable investment projects or simply windfall gains when 
investment projects would also have been taken place in the absence of any subsidy. 
Alternatively, local governments that select subsidy candidates may be poorly qualified 
to identify profitable entrepreneurs. The significantly negative infrastructure coefficient 
could indicate in line with Brakman et al. (2002) an inefficienct provision of public 
goods. If local governments provide (tax-financed) public goods inefficiently, spatial 
spreading of economic activity can be the consequence. The rational in their model is 
that given taxes, agents require a certain return in terms of an attractive socio-economic 
framework in the region, for instance in terms of schools, infrastructure, or other public 
goods provided. Effective public goods provision can then also compensate for 
relatively higher taxes. But failure to deliver such compensation leads in their model to 
migration of the mobile factor, i.e. capital, thereby reducing economic agglomeration.    7
The detrimental effects of subsidies for regional growth are most obvious for 
infrastructure investments. Individually, this effect is significantly negative. This result 
contradicts earlier findings that governmental public goods provision complements 
private investment and private wealth accumulation (see, for example, Aschauer, 1989 
or Ravallion and Jalan, 1996). In the present regional context, however, negative growth 
effects of infrastructure may also indicate that better infrastructure reduces 
transportation cost, which causes economic activity to shift to other regions. We control 
more explicitly for possible spatial interdependencies below. Before, we test if the 
interaction of business and infrastructure subsidies spurs growth because Rodriguez-
Pose and Fratesi (2004) note that support packages covering multiple dimensions, e.g. 
infrastructure and income aid, are more likely to promote growth compared to one-
dimensional support schemes. The two rightmost columns in Table 3 show that this is 
not the case in our sample. The simultaneous specification of both forms of aid does 
imply that one percent more business aid spurs regional growth by 1.4 percent and even 
more when interacted with more infrastructure investment aid. But the negative 
individual effect of infrastructure investments outweighs any potential direct gains from 
business support. 
We have two concerns regarding these results. First, a pooled sample of both 
eastern and western districts might neglect structural differences and the possibility that 
multiple equilibria exist across German regions (Funke and Niebuhr, 2005). While a 
number of western districts also receive subsidies, negative externalities from poor or 
non-existent infrastructure and hardly developed entrepreneurial support systems, for 
example a local financial service sector, may be particularly relevant in eastern regions. 
Therefore, the effect of subsidies in these regions is likely to be systematically different 
and we consider sub-samples in the first two columns in Table 4. Results confirm that 
business support subsidies have no significant impact in either region. The negative 
effect of infrastructure investment subsidies vanishes in the sample including only 
eastern regions. But it remains significantly negative for regions in the West.  
This result does not necessarily imply that government infrastructure aid is always 
detrimental to growth. But it may suggest that the form of providing infrastructure 
support is ineffective to promote growth. Potentially, projects are supported without a   8 
sufficient focus on (a few) core regions but aim instead at a spatially even distribution 
of support that does not permit any region to develop as a core of economic activity.  
Table 4: Spatially weighted subsidies and region specific samples 
EAST WEST Spatial CIS Spatial INFRA Spatial BOTH Spatial INTER
GDP1992 0.573*** 0.954*** 0.891*** 0.891*** 0.895*** 0.895***
[5.98] [33.98] [31.20] [31.14] [31.10] [31.00]
CIS 0.145 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
[0.70] [0.11] [0.15] [0.12] [0.38] [0.37]
INFRA -0.104 -0.042*** -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.073***
[0.44] [3.13] [5.99] [5.81] [5.10] [5.09]
CIS x INFRA 0.008 0.011 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
[0.18] [1.60] [5.03] [5.02] [5.01] [5.02]
Spatial weight CIS 0.001 0.116 0.083
[0.03] [1.00] [0.48]
Spatial weight INFRA -0.005 -0.118 -0.149
[0.21] [1.06] [0.78]
Spatial weight (CIS x INFRA) 0.008
[0.22]
EAST dummy 0.053 0.057 0.06 0.056
[0.57] [0.61] [0.64] [0.57]
Investment ratio 0.176 0.181*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.257***
[1.20] [2.72] [3.43] [3.45] [3.34] [3.33]
Human Capital 0.163*** 0.036* 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.051***
[3.58] [1.86] [2.79] [2.79] [2.68] [2.67]
Population growth -0.039 0.310* 0.136 0.134 0.161 0.161
[0.23] [1.91] [0.97] [0.96] [1.13] [1.13]
Constant 4.733*** 1.860*** 2.264*** 2.277*** 2.189*** 2.314***
[2.77] [4.21] [5.35] [5.37] [5.13] [3.19]
Observations 93 326 419 419 419 419
Implied λ 0.043 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
R-squared 0.64 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1 percent. CIS denotes bussiness aid transfers to districts and INFRA measure regional 
infrastructure investment subsidies. All variables measures as logged mean values per district between 1992 and 2005.  Implied λ denotes the speed of 
convergence.  
Alternatively, the neglect of possible benefits from spatial spill-over effects may 
distort our results. While increased infrastructure investment may ‘pull’ economic 
activity out of a particular region, it may at the same time spur growth in neighboring 
regions. Therefore, we follow Anselin (1988) and include spatial lags to test if 
economic growth in region r depends on subsidies received in neighboring regions s∈R, 
where R is the set of all regions. To this end, we use a (geographical) distance matrix W 
to weight the subsidies received by all neighboring regions to measure if growth in 
region r is affected by subsidies received in regions s.  
The results for individually and jointly specified spatial subsidy effects are 
insignificant. Either form of aid also fails to benefit regional growth through an indirect 
spill-over channel. The direct, negative net effect of infrastructure and corporate 
investment subsidies, in turn, remains unchanged. Therefore, our main conclusion 
remains that interregional subsidies for infrastructural and corporate investment did not 
spur economic growth in Germany’s regions.    9
5 Robustness 
We further test the robustness of our results along several lines of possible 
objections. First, so far we attempted to capture spatial spillovers using spatially 
weighted terms of our subsidy variables. However, macroeconomic interaction between 
regions may more properly be captured by spatially weighted GDP. In Table 6 in the 
appendix, we estimated a mixed spatial autoregressive model and show the results in 
column 1. The evidence regarding our key variables CIS and Infra remains unchanged. 
With regard to the spatially weighted GDP we observe a positive and significant effect 
which suggests that GDP in a region follows macroeconomic developments in 
neighboring regions.
7 Second, we instrument CIS and Infra to control for the potential 
endogeneity of subsidies. We specify GDP in 1994 as lagged endogenous variable and 
use GDP in 1992 as an instrument for CIS and Infra. Columns 2 to 5 in Table 6 contain 
the results which show that the results are largely in line with the previous finding that 
subsidies have not spurred growth. As a third concern we address the large migration of 
skilled labor out of East Germany. In column 6 of Table 6 we include the cumulative 
average growth rate (CAGR) of human capital over the period from 1994 to 2005 
instead of human capital. The coefficients of CIS and Infra remain unchanged while the 
CAGR of human capital is insignificant. Finally, we use initial values instead of 
averages for human capital, the investment ratio and the subsidy variables to encompass 
alternative model specifications. The results regarding CIS and Infra in the Tables 7 and 
8 mirror the previous results.  
6 Conclusion 
We use data on interregional infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies 
among 419 German districts to assess the effects on regional growth. Using a neo-
classical growth model, we find that the net effect of subsidy payments is significantly 
negative. This result is robust for both districts located in old and new federal states. 
Convergence among eastern districts is fairly slow (4.3%) but virtually non-existing 
when considering western regions, too. Only when higher infrastructure investments are 
                                                 
7  Note that these results are subject to an important caveat since estimation of spatial autoregressive 
models can yield biased and inconsistent coefficients (Anselin (1988)). Further research using spatial 
mixed autoregressive models is therefore warranted but out of the scope of the present paper.   10 
paired with regional business support, we identify a statistically significant growth 
impetus. This is, however, crowded out by the negative influence of infrastructure 
subsidies on growth, which indicates a dominant ‘pull’ effect of economic activity out 
of districts. This absence of positive subsidy payment effects on regional growth 
persists after accounting for spatial spillover effects. Our results do not imply per se that 
infrastructure and other interregional aid is detrimental to growth. They may rather 
indicate a too uniform regional development policy that fails to promote growth poles 
paired with regional governments that possess no comparative advantage to identify 
successful entrepreneurs and an efficient provision of infrastructure. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Investment Funding: Map of Assisted Areas 
 
   Subsidies Rates of Assisted Areas 
   Assisted Areas  SME  Non-SME 
           A 50%  35% 
 B  43% 28% 
 C  28% 18% 
  D  7.5% - 15%  0% 
  E  7.5% - 15%  0% 
   F  0%  0%   13
Table 5: Percentage Share of Subsidies to CIS and Infrastructure in Total Subsidies to 
respective Regions and Total Subsidies in % of Gross Fixed Capital Investment (GFCI), 
1991-2007 
Year CIS Infrastructure as % of GFCI CIS Infrastructure as % of GFCI
1991 9.2% 17% 0.23% 91% 83% 9%
1992 11.4% 14% 0.18% 89% 86% 5%
1993 7.8% 8% 0.16% 92% 92% 5%
1994 7.7% 5% 0.13% 92% 95% 5%
1995 8.9% 6% 0.11% 91% 94% 4%
1996 6.8% 10% 0.11% 93% 90% 3%
1997 11.2% 6% 0.12% 89% 93% 3%
1998 8.7% 7% 0.10% 91% 93% 3%
1999 14.8% 7% 0.13% 85% 93% 3%
2000 11.6% 9% 0.07% 88% 91% 2%
2001 11.3% 14% 0.09% 89% 86% 3%
2002 10.7% 19% 0.11% 89% 80% 3%
2003 15.1% 21% 0.13% 85% 79% 3%
2004 10.4% 19% 0.08% 90% 81% 3%
2005 13.2% 17% 0.09% 87% 83% 2%
2006 11.7% 17% n.a. 88% 83% n.a.
2007 14.2% 3% n.a. 87% 97% n.a.
Average 10.4% 11% 0.12% 90% 89% 4%
Old Federal States New Federal States
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Table 6: Robustness: Spatially weighted GDP, IV Estimation and Cumulative Rate of 
Change (CAGR) for Human Capital 
Spatial IV CIS  IV Infra IV CIS IV Infra CAGR HC
GDP Both Both
GDPt=1 0.899*** 0.947*** 0.942*** 0.982*** 0.96 0.938***
[32.44] [17.30] [25.56] [2.67] [1.50] [38.36]
CIS 0.00 0.018 0.133 0.274 -0.003
[0.02] [0.25] [0.14] [0.04] [0.41]
Infra -0.068*** 0.021 -0.143 -1.516 -0.080***
[4.98] [0.25] [0.30] [0.04] [5.98]
CIS*Infra. 0.023*** 0.002 0.309 0.025***
[4.97] [0.01] [0.05] [4.95]
Population Growth 0.183 0.075 0.027 0.387 0.206 0.139
[1.34] [0.19] [0.12] [0.12] [0.03] [1.00]
Inv.Ratio 0.269*** 0.175* 0.198** 0.021 -0.813 0.178**
[3.58] [1.94] [2.52] [0.02] [0.04] [2.33]
Human Capital 0.048** 0.041 0.039* 0.05 -0.041
[2.56] [1.55] [1.76] [0.34] [0.02]
dyEAST 0.055 -0.052 -0.076 0.102 -0.848 0.185**
[0.62] [0.26] [0.26] [0.06] [0.05] [2.06]
Spatial GDP 0.075**
[2.46]
CAGR Human Capital 0.025
[0.73]
Constant 1.477*** 1.316*** 1.293*** 1.458 -0.145 1.545***
[3.12] [2.61] [2.82] [0.60] [0.00] [5.02]
Observations 419 419 419 419 419 419
R-squared 0.9 0.9 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.89
Note: Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The initial value of the
endogenous variable GDPt=1 refers to the year 1994 in the IV estimation given that GDP per capita in 1992 was used to
instrument CIS or Infra respectively. The cumulative average growth rate (CAGR HC) is calculated over the period 1994 to
2005    15
Table 7: Robustness: Baseline Specification using Initial Values 
Baseline CIS Infra Both Inter
GDP1992 0.883*** 0.887*** 0.881*** 0.887*** 0.887***
[29.84] [29.74] [29.72] [29.68] [30.13]
CIS 0.005 0.007 0.001
[0.93] [1.22] [0.21]




Population Growth 0.131 0.146 0.129 0.151 0.088
[0.95] [1.03] [0.95] [1.08] [0.63]
Inv. Ratio 0.341*** 0.344*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 0.314***
[4.66] [4.70] [4.48] [4.53] [4.46]
Human Capital 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.056***
[3.24] [3.26] [3.13] [3.15] [3.03]
dyEAST 0.107 0.091 0.124 0.109 0.092
[1.22] [1.01] [1.33] [1.17] [1.01]
Constant 2.450*** 2.446*** 2.449*** 2.444*** 2.257***
[5.38] [5.44] [5.37] [5.45] [5.09]
Observations 419 419 419 419 419
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All explanatory variables as of 1992 except population growth which enters as an average
and human capital which starts in 1994.    16 
Table 8: Robustness: Specification using Initial Values and Spatial Control Variables 
East West Spatial CIS Spatial Infra Spatial Both Spatial Inter
GDP1992 0.500*** 0.957*** 0.885*** 0.886*** 0.886*** 0.886***
[6.50] [34.48] [30.19] [30.11] [30.66] [30.58]
CIS -0.021 -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
[0.69] [0.89] [0.26] [0.26] [0.17] [0.27]
Infra -0.103*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.026***
[3.68] [2.62] [3.13] [3.06] [3.32] [3.23]
CIS*Infra 0.018** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[2.61] [2.80] [2.71] [2.59] [2.96] [2.84]
Spatial CIS 0.00 -0.001* -0.001*
[1.29] [1.96] [1.95]




Population Growth -0.047 0.249* 0.052 0.067 0.044 0.045
[0.29] [1.73] [0.35] [0.46] [0.30] [0.31]
Inv. Ratio 0.282*** 0.214*** 0.337*** 0.325*** 0.356*** 0.353***
[2.73] [3.51] [4.76] [4.61] [5.05] [5.02]
Human Capital 0.134*** 0.030* 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056***
[2.80] [1.66] [3.11] [3.09] [3.10] [3.09]
dyEAST 0.094 0.097 0.068 0.071
[1.04] [1.06] [0.75] [0.79]
Constant 5.925*** 1.688*** 2.242*** 2.249*** 2.237*** 2.253***
[6.83] [4.08] [4.99] [5.02] [5.04] [5.07]
Observations 93 326 419 419 419 419
R-squared 0.59 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All explanatory variables as of 1992 except population growth which enters as an average and human capital which starts in 1994. 
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